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Delaware Lawyer Search - Listings for Pedigo Robt W Atty
Name: Pedigo Robt W Atty
Address: 824 N Market St Wilmington, DE 19801
Phone Number: 302-652-3641
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Specialties:
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Wills, Estates, Trusts & Probate Law
Adoption, Divorce & Family Law
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Cases related to this attorney's specialties:
HILLSIDE DAIRY INC. et al. v. LYONS, SECRETARY, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 01-950. Argued April 22, 2003-Decided June 9, 2003* In most of the country, but not California, the minimum price paid to dairy farmers producing raw milk is regulated pursuant to federal marketing orders, which guarantee a uniform price for the producers, but through pooling mechanisms require the processors of different classes of dairy products to pay different prices. California has adopted a similar, although more complex, program to regulate the minimum prices paid by California processors to California producers. Three state statutes create California's milk marketing structure: 1935 and 1967 Acts establish milk pricing and pooling plans, while a 1947 Act governs the composition of milk products sold in the State. Under the state scheme, California processors of fluid milk pay a premium price (part of which goes into a price equalization pool) that is higher than the prices paid to producers. During the 1990's, it became profitable for some California processors to buy raw milk from out-of-state producers. In 1997, the California Department of Food and Agriculture amended its regulations to require contributions to the price equalization pool on some out-of-state purchases. Petitioners, out-of-state dairy farmers, brought these suits, alleging that the 1997 amendment unconstitutionally discriminates against them. Without reaching the merits, the District Court dismissed both cases. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding, inter alia, that a 1996 federal statute immunized California's milk pricing and pooling laws from Commerce Clause challenge, and that the individual petitioners' Privileges and Immunities Clause claims failed because the 1997 amendment did not, on its face, create classifications based on any individual's residency or citizenship. Held: 1. California's milk pric...
FINER FOODS INC v. AGRI In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit No. 01-4024 Finer Foods, Inc., Petitioner, v. United States Department of Agriculture, Respondent. Petition for Review of an Order of the Department of Agriculture Under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act Submitted December 7, 2001-Decided December 11, 2001 Before Bauer, Easterbrook, and Williams, Circuit Judges. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge. Finer Foods, Inc., seeks a stay pending judicial review of an administrative order suspending its license to operate as a dealer under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. sec.sec. 499a- 499s. The Department of Agriculture offers two jurisdictional defenses. First, it contends, the court lacks personal juris diction over the Department because the petition for review was forwarded to federal officials in Washington, D.C., by fax rather than by mail, as the Hobbs Act requires. See 28 U.S.C. sec.2344. Second, it asserts, the court lacks subject- matter jurisdiction because there is no "final" administrative order. See 28 U.S.C. sec.2342(2). Both of these contentions are frivolous. We are surprised and disappointed that they have been advanced by counsel for the federal government. (We add for the sake of completeness that all three lawyers whose names appear on the papers work for the Department of Agriculture; the Department of Justice apparently has allowed the agency to represent itself.) Once a private party files a petition for review, this court's Clerk must serve the federal agency by registered mail (return receipt requested). In light of the disruptions to the postal system caused by terrorist activity in recent months, the Clerk has begun to forward papers by fax in addition to mail. Naturally the fax copy arrives first, for it is not delayed by any security screening procedures. Why should this step deprive the court of personal jurisdiction over the Department? In this case, notice was sent by mail ...
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